Kursk offensive operation 1943. Battle of Kursk and tank battle for Prokhorovka. The victory at Kursk marked the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the offensive.

At the headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Land Forces, when the true face of Hitler the strategist emerged When Klaus arrived at the Organization Department of the OKH, he was still under the impression of the victorious campaign in France. It was an incredible success, the euphoria of victory was equal to

Appendix 1. HEADS OF INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENTS OF THE FRONT HEADQUARTERS THAT TOOK PART IN THE BATTLE OF KURK PETER NIKIFOROVICH CHEKMAZOVMajor General?. N. Chekmazov during the Battle of Kursk was the head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Central Front (August - October

In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - the Battle of Kursk. The Nazis’ dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.

Total mobilization - selected generals, the best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, airplanes - this was Adolf Hitler's order - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, demonstrably, taking revenge for all previous lost battles . A matter of prestige.

(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful Operation Citadel that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)

It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable Tiger tank, which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was no match for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: “We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks.”

The Battle of Kursk began on July 5 and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the “Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of Victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk.”

Moiarussia has collected the most interesting facts about this great confrontation:

Operation Citadel

In April 1943, Hitler approved a military operation codenamed Zitadelle (“Citadel”). To carry it out, a total of 50 divisions were involved, including 16 tank and motorized divisions; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk ledge.

German sources wrote: “The Kursk salient seemed a particularly suitable place for such a strike. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful group of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to destroy those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge will significantly shorten the front line... True, some even then argued that the enemy was expecting a German offensive in this area and... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that Operation Citadel would be a success if undertaken soon."

The Germans prepared for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. Its start was postponed twice: the guns were not ready, the new tanks were not delivered, and the new aircraft did not have time to pass tests. On top of that, Hitler feared that Italy was about to leave the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to the original plan. The fanatical Hitler believed that if you strike in the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this battle, then

“The victory at Kursk,” he said, “will capture the imagination of the whole world.”

Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk salient, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that in terms of the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, he would lose this battle, but thanks to an ambitious, strategically correct plan and the latest weapons, which, according to military experts of the Soviet army, would be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority would be absolutely vulnerable and useless.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time. The Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolay Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin’s initial support for Vatutin’s plan, they approved Rokossovsky’s safer plan - “to wait, wear down and go on a counteroffensive.” Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and primarily by Zhukov.

However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.

Having waited for the latest equipment - Tiger and Panther tanks, the Germans began their offensive on the night of July 5, 1943.

That same night, Rokossovsky had a telephone conversation with Stalin:

- Comrade Stalin! The Germans have launched an offensive!

-What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.

– Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin! - answered the commander.

Rokossovsky was not mistaken.

Agent "Werther"

On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, translated from German, appeared on Stalin’s desk, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was Hitler’s own visa. He staged it three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.

Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command except his code name - “Werther”. Various researchers have put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.

Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) is the code name of an alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even as part of the top of the Third Reich during World War II, one of Stirlitz's prototypes. During the entire time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not make a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.

Hitler’s personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The leaders of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss station as if they were requesting information from some information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that during all phases of the war in Russia, agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Some of the information transmitted could only have been obtained from the highest German military circles

- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer Headquarters.”

The largest tank battle

The key moment of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.

Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the opposing sides still causes fierce debate among historians.

Classic Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and reduce the number of German ones.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin, etc.), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).

Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, the son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company and a direct participant in the battle:

According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk ledge, destroy the Russian troops involved in it and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on an armistice.

In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives a detailed description of the disposition of the battle, its course and result:

“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans needed to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the battle.

The unexpected attack on the deeply advanced spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible manner. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.

The Russians drove, if they managed to get that far at all, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fume - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, some of them had run over each other, Russian infantrymen had jumped between them, desperately trying to get their bearings and easily turning into victims of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who were also standing on this battlefield.

The attacking Russian tanks - there must have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed."

As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans “with surprisingly small losses” occupied “almost completely” their previous positions.

The Germans were stunned by the wastefulness of the Russian command, which abandoned hundreds of tanks with infantrymen on their armor to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.

“Stalin allegedly wanted to put on trial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We did not see a chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against superior enemy forces, unless significant reinforcements were added. However, there were none.”

It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded - as he had not lived up to the high hopes placed on him by Headquarters.

One way or another, Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of plans for the German summer offensive.

It is believed that Hitler himself gave the order to end the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and the need to send German reinforcements to Italy loomed.

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"

When people talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel, the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the Wehrmacht onslaught was repulsed, the Soviet troops carried out two of their offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than “Citadel”.

On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to “Kutuzov”, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Orel.

On August 3, 1943, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began an offensive operation "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then began to liberate the territory of Left Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing Nazi forces and reached Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 a.m., troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.

“Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943, it was held in Moscow to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Maresyev's feat

The book of the writer Boris Polevoy “The Tale of a Real Man,” which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.

But not everyone knows that the fame of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, arose precisely during the Battle of Kursk.

Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived in the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, was faced with distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him, fearing that a pilot with prosthetics would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.

Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him as his partner. Maresyev coped with the task, and at the height of the battles on the Kursk Bulge he carried out combat missions along with everyone else.

On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexey Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.

This story immediately became known throughout the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

It is interesting that during his participation in battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to duty after amputation of both legs.

Battle of Kursk - losses of both sides

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops exceeded the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irrevocable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.

After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces at the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive.

In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of those who died, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.

August 23, 1943 is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the most extensive and long routes of retreat on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.

As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the greatness and steadfastness of the Soviet soldier was demonstrated to the whole world. Our allies have no doubts or hesitations about the correct choice of side in this war. And the thoughts that let the Russians and Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the outside, faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which will receive vast territories at the end of the war. However, that's another story...

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It would seem that there should be no doubt about the correctness of the plan adopted then - to repel the German offensive and then launch a counter-offensive. However, published in the 1990s. comparative data on losses in the Battle of Kursk cast doubt on this. Moreover, on the eve of the battle, not everyone in the Soviet command supported the idea of ​​​​a defensive nature of actions.

During the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops lost 863.3 thousand people (including 254.5 thousand irrevocably), 6,064 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5,244 guns and mortars, 1,626 combat aircraft. The Wehrmacht's losses amounted, according to our data: about half a million people, one and a half thousand tanks, 3,000 guns and mortars, 3,700 aircraft. For all types of weapons, with the exception of aircraft, the losses of Soviet troops were much more significant.

The idea of ​​attacking near Kursk and cutting off the bulge of the Soviet front that had formed here arose among Hitler and his military during the Wehrmacht counteroffensive near Kharkov in February-March 1943. This counteroffensive showed that the German army was still capable of seizing the strategic initiative. In addition, the Soviet command was afraid of repeating its mistake in the spring of 1942, when attempts to attack first led to a heavy defeat near Kharkov, which determined the unsuccessful course of the entire summer campaign of 1942. The Red Army has so far been very bad at conducting an offensive in the summer.

At the suggestion of Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky this time was supposed to give the initiative of offensive actions to the enemy in advance, wear him down with stubborn defense and, after suffering heavy losses, launch a counterattack. It was no secret that the Germans would attack near Kursk.

This plan aroused objections from the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin, who had to repel a German attack south of Kursk. In his opinion, giving the initiative to the enemy was inappropriate. The condition of the Soviet troops and the balance of forces at the front made it possible to launch an assault. Waiting for a German strike meant, Vatutin believed, wasting time. Vatutin proposed to strike the Germans first if they did not go on the offensive before the beginning of July. Stalin instructed the commanders of the Central and Reserve (Steppe) Fronts K.K. Rokossovsky and R.Ya. Malinovsky to present his thoughts on this issue. But Zhukov and Vasilevsky defended the previously proposed plan. The Soviet offensive was supposed to begin only after the German one had broken down.

When was it more convenient for the Red Army to attack: in the spring or in the summer?

Throughout the spring and early summer, both sides concentrated additional forces near Kursk. Books usually provide data indicating that by July 1943, the Red Army had achieved significant superiority over the Wehrmacht in forces and means on the Kursk Bulge. But at the same time, the number of Soviet troops in April 1943 is considered without reserves, and in July - taking into account such. If we apply equal calculation criteria, then the differences between April and July will not be so convincing.

So, without taking into account reserves, by July 5 the ratio of forces on the Kursk Bulge was: for people - 1.5 to 1, for artillery - 2.1 to 1, for tanks - 1.2 to 1 in favor of the Soviet troops, for aircraft - 1.1 to 1 in favor of the Germans. The same indicators in April were: 1.4 to 1; 1.9 to 1; 1.2 to 1; 1 to 1.3 respectively.

Taking into account reserves, the advantage of the Soviet troops at the beginning of April near Kursk was as follows: in terms of people - 1.8 to 1, in artillery - 3.2 to 1, in tanks - 1.3 to 1, in the number of aircraft the Germans came out ahead - they had 1.1 times more bombers. Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet superiority was: in people - 2:1, in artillery - 3:1, in tanks - 1.5:1, in aircraft - 1.2:1.

As you can see, three months before the start of the Battle of Kursk, the proportion changed in a direction more favorable for the Red Army very slightly.

Who was better prepared?

In April 1943, German troops on the Eastern Front were not yet armed with the latest Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as vehicles of a new modification - T-IV, which were superior in armament and armor to the Soviet T-34-76. Hitler's constant postponements of Operation Citadel were caused by the desire to fill his troops as densely as possible with these powerful tanks.

In more than three months, German troops completely overcame the “Stalingrad syndrome” and sharply increased their morale.

Everything was hanging by a thread

The results of the defensive battle near Kursk are not clear-cut. North of Kursk, the enemy did not achieve serious success in battles with the troops of the Central Front. He penetrated the defenses of the Soviet troops only 10 km, and by the end of the fifth day of battle his offensive was stopped.

Events on the Voronezh Front developed completely differently. Here the Germans broke through all defensive lines to a depth of 35 km for a week and inflicted great damage on Soviet tank forces (especially in the battle of Prokhorovka). However, Hitler ordered Operation Citadel to end on July 12. This happened for two reasons.

Firstly, only a simultaneous breakthrough of German troops to Kursk - from the north and from the south - could have operational significance. The success of Army Group South remained a tactical victory that had no such significance. Secondly, on July 10, the landing of Anglo-American troops in Sicily began, forcing the Germans to send there part of the aircraft from the Eastern Front.

Time was against Germany

Considering that the military production of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition was increasingly outpacing the military production of the Third Reich in terms of growth, the idea of ​​waiting time and accumulating more forces and resources was, in principle, correct for the Soviet command. Moreover, the start of the German offensive coincided successfully with the activation of the Western allies. However, such a reliance on waiting could only work successfully if the Germans had not managed to create some kind of “superweapon” - an atomic bomb, effective missiles, and numerous jet aircraft. And no one could guarantee that they would not have succeeded.

The Battle of Kursk (summer 1943) radically changed the course of World War II.

Our army stopped the Nazi offensive and irrevocably took the strategic initiative in the further course of the war into its own hands.

Wehrmacht plans

Despite the huge losses, by the summer of 1943 the fascist army was still very strong, and Hitler intended to take revenge for his defeat in . To restore its former prestige, it needed a major victory at any cost.

To achieve this, Germany carried out a total mobilization and strengthened its military industry, mainly due to the capabilities of the occupied territories of Western Europe. This, of course, gave the expected results. And since there was no longer a second front in the West, the German government directed all its military resources to the Eastern Front.

He managed not only to restore his army, but also to replenish it with the latest models of military equipment. The largest offensive operation, Operation Citadel, was carefully planned, and was given great strategic importance. To implement the plan, the fascist command chose the Kursk direction.

The task was this: to break through the defenses of the Kursk ledge, reach Kursk, surround it and destroy the Soviet troops who defended this territory. All efforts were directed toward this idea of ​​the lightning defeat of our troops. It was planned to defeat the million-strong group of Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, encircle and take Kursk in literally four days.

This plan is set out in detail in order No. 6 of April 15, 1943 with a poetic conclusion: “The victory at Kursk should be a torch for the whole world.”

Based on our intelligence data, the enemy’s plans regarding the direction of his main attacks and the timing of the offensive became known at Headquarters. Headquarters carefully analyzed the situation, and as a result it was decided that it would be more profitable for us to start the campaign with a strategic defensive operation.

Knowing that Hitler would attack only in one direction and concentrate the main striking forces here, our command came to the conclusion that it was defensive battles that would bleed the German army and destroy its tanks. After this, it will be advisable to crush the enemy by breaking up his main group.

Marshal reported this to Headquarters on 04/08/43: “wear down” the enemy on the defensive, knock out his tanks, and then bring in fresh reserves and go on a general offensive, finishing off the main forces of the Nazis. Thus, the Headquarters deliberately planned to make the beginning of the Battle of Kursk defensive.

Preparing for battle

From mid-April 1943, work began on the creation of powerful defensive positions on the Kursk salient. They dug trenches, trenches and ammunition magazines, built bunkers, prepared firing positions and observation posts. Having finished work in one place, they moved on and again began to dig and build, repeating the work at the previous position.

At the same time, they prepared fighters for the upcoming battles, conducting training sessions close to real combat. A participant in these events, B. N. Malinovsky, wrote about this in his memoirs in the book “We Didn’t Choose Our Fate.” During these preparatory work, he writes, they received military reinforcements: people, equipment. At the beginning of the battle, our troops here numbered up to 1.3 million people.

Steppe Front

The strategic reserves, consisting of formations that had already participated in the battles for Stalingrad, Leningrad and other battles of the Soviet-German front, were first united into the Reserve Front, which was formed on 04/15/43. was named the Steppe Military District (commander I.S. Konev), and later - during the Battle of Kursk - 07/10/43, it began to be called the Steppe Front.

It included troops of the Voronezh and central fronts. Command of the front was entrusted to Colonel General I. S. Konev, who after the Battle of Kursk became an army general, and in February 1944 - Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Battle of Kursk

The battle began on July 5, 1943. Our troops were ready for it. The Nazis carried out fire raids from an armored train, bombers fired from the air, the enemies dropped leaflets in which they tried to intimidate Soviet soldiers with the upcoming terrible offensive, claiming that no one would be saved in it.

Our fighters immediately entered the battle, earned Katyushas, ​​and our tanks and self-propelled guns went to meet the enemy with his new Tigers and Ferdinands. Artillery and infantry destroyed their vehicles in prepared minefields, with anti-tank grenades and simply with petrol bottles.

Already in the evening of the first day of the battle, the Soviet Information Bureau reported that on July 5, 586 fascist tanks and 203 aircraft were destroyed in the battle. By the end of the day, the number of enemy aircraft shot down had grown to 260. Fierce fighting continued until July 9.

The enemy had undermined his forces and was forced to order a temporary halt to the offensive in order to make some changes to the original plan. But then the fighting resumed. Our troops still managed to stop the German offensive, although in some places the enemy broke through our defenses 30-35 km deep.

Tank battle

A large-scale tank battle played a huge role in the turning point of the Battle of Kursk in the Prokhorovka area. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns were involved in it on both sides.

General valor was demonstrated in this battle by the general of the 5th Guards. tank army P. A. Rotmistrov, General of the 5th Guards Army A. S. Zhdanov and heroic fortitude - the entire personnel.

Thanks to the organization and courage of our commanders and fighters, the offensive plans of the fascists were finally buried in this fierce battle. The enemy's forces were exhausted, he had already brought his reserves into the battle, had not yet entered the defensive stage, and had already stopped the offensive.

This was a very convenient moment for our troops to transition from defense to counteroffensive. By July 12, the enemy was drained of blood, and the crisis of his offensive had ripened. This was a turning point in the Battle of Kursk.

Counteroffensive

On July 12, the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive, and on July 15, the Central Front. And on July 16, the Germans had already begun to withdraw their troops. Then the Voronezh Front joined the offensive, and on July 18 - the Steppe Front. The retreating enemy was pursued, and by July 23 our troops had restored the situation that existed before the defensive battles, i.e. returned, as it were, to the starting point.

For the final victory in the Battle of Kursk, it was necessary to massively introduce strategic reserves, and in the most important direction. The Steppe Front proposed such tactics. But Headquarters, unfortunately, did not accept the decision of the Steppe Front and decided to introduce strategic reserves in parts and not simultaneously.

This led to the fact that the end of the Battle of Kursk was delayed in time. From July 23 to August 3 there was a pause. The Germans retreated to previously prepared defensive lines. And our command needed time to study the enemy’s defenses and organize the troops after the battles.

The commanders understood that the enemy would not leave his prepared positions, and would fight to the last, just to stop the advance of the Soviet troops. And then our offensive continued. There were still many bloody battles with huge losses on both sides. The Battle of Kursk lasted 50 days and ended on August 23, 1943. The Wehrmacht's plans completely failed.

The meaning of the Battle of Kursk

History has shown that the Battle of Kursk became a turning point during the Second World War, the starting point for the transfer of strategic initiative to the Soviet army. lost half a million people and a huge amount of military equipment in the Battle of Kursk.

This defeat of Hitler also influenced the situation on an international scale, because it provided the preconditions for Germany’s loss of allied cooperation with. And in the end, the struggle on the fronts where the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition fought was greatly facilitated.